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Spirituality in China?
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Abstract
The decade of experience following the 9/11 incident suggests a complex process 
of international development with a particular resurgence of interest in religios-
ity and spirituality. This paper attempts to explore the situation of spirituality in 
China. Several casesof moral degeneration on the part of public administrators 
and a silent crisis in governance can be related to the spirituality/non-spirituality 
factor and this situation suggests that China's leaders may do well to reinvent their 
country's public administration by working on elements of spirituality as they 
proceed with the process of market reforms, though this may be a lengthy struggle.
Keywords: China, religiosity, spirituality, governance, administration.
Introduction
A growing body of evidence demonstrates that spirituality produces a 
subtle but pervasive inﬂuence on judgement and decision-making. There 
is also an ongoing debate over the way globalisation and intensiﬁed 
international interaction are leading to a restructuring of administrative 
practices in order to achieve greater coherence and efﬁciency. Taken 
together these two strands of enquiry could suggest that spirituality 
can be used to off-set threats of institutional instability promoted by 
weakened multilateral institutions, the accelerated rate of globalisation 
and the rise of transnational issues that are too large to be managed by 
individual nation-states. 
I have divided my paper into three sections. In the ﬁrst I offer a discus-
sion of aspects of the role of religion in China and in the second I discuss 
professionalism, spirituality and governance. In the third and last sec-
tion of my paper I brieﬂy outline a number of administrative issues and 
circumstances that point to a silent crisis in national governance. 
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The religious situation in China
The concepts of religion and spirituality can be seen to be distinct. As 
Ashforth and Pratt (2003) state, 'the locus of spirituality resides in the 
individual'. By way of contrast, religion is typically regarded as more 
extrinsically focused, calling attention to institutional beliefs and prac-
tices and afﬁliation with an identiﬁable group (Berry 2005; Marler and 
Hadaway 2002; Pargament 1999). Religion is a set of principles, values, 
and doctrines that provide an ethical and moral framework for under-
standing, motivation, and behaviour (King, 2000). Spirituality may be 
more acceptable than religion due to its personal and individual nature 
though both inﬂuence the public and private lives of individuals. It has 
been argued that spirituality is particularly important and that culti-
vating a supportive and accommodating environment brings beneﬁts 
to organisations.  According to theories of public service motivation, 
public employees are expected to be committed to the public good 
and characterised by an ethic that is built on benevolence, life in the 
service of others and a desire to affect the community (Houston 2006). 
Religiosity and particularly spirituality may well strengthen standards 
of public administration and ofﬁcial behaviour and so strengthen na-
tional governance. 
The Chinese word for 'religion' zongjiao itself denotes 'ancestral 
teaching', reﬂecting the Chinese emphasis on a collective relationship 
with the past rather than an individual's faith in a supernatural being. 
Popular religion has always been dismissed as superstition, particu-
larly by Marxists. For the sociologist Emile Durkheim, religion persists 
because it offers symbolic expression of the loyalty felt by all individu-
als to the social group that enfolds and sustains their lives. Marxist 
theorists drew on similar conclusion, but argued that religion is a false 
form of consciousness. Today, China's largely apolitical populace has 
demonstrated that they are likely go along with the suppression of 
religiosity. They do this in the name of social stability. This situation 
brings us to the question - Is there freedom to profess religion in China 
and to what extent is religion practiced and tolerated by the govern-
ment? It is difﬁcult to answer this question. It may be more appropriate 
to argue that Chinese citizens function within the realm of patriotism. 
After the Cultural Revolution, religions have existed within the con-
text of patriotism and atheism; and all other religious activities were 
looked upon as threats, feudalistic and superstitious. Perhaps the best 
word that describes the government policy on religion is pragmatism 
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(Ariarajah 1986). It also has to be recognized that religion cannot be 
removed by force.  
The widespread impression of China is that it is continuing to leap for-
ward at least in terms of economic growth. The Chinese Communist Party 
maintains a monopoly of power and yet no political reform is evident. 
Spirituality or values of traditional Chinese culture have inclined to the 
ideology of Mao Zedong with many scholars pointing to the consistency 
and continuity of Confucianism and Chinese Communist ideology after 
the founding of the People's Republic of China (Pye 1985). 
In traditional China people believed that all power emanated from 
above and centre resulting in a single supreme ruler. Careful research 
has shown that by the Shang period (1766-1123 B.C.) the term Shangdi 
(Lord on High) or Di (Lord) was already in use to refer to the highest of 
the gods, perhaps even to a creator god. In the Chou period (1122-249 
B.C.), the term most often used for God was Tian (Heaven), symbolised 
by a large human head. After the Chou conquered the Shang, both 
Di and Tian were used to refer to God, which was understood as a 
personal God. During the Han dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 C.E.), yin-yang 
thinking began to be absorbed into both Confucianism and Taoism. 
Although a reading of Taoist material might give one the impression 
that it claims that Ultimate Reality is somehow a combination of op-
posites, yin and yang, dark and light, good and evil, such a reading 
would indeed be superﬁcial as in the Daode Jing (Tao Te Ching) itself, 
the Dao (Tao) is prior to heaven and earth – i.e., before duality (see 
Swidler and Mojzes, 2000). Dong Zhongshu (180-115 B.C), an eminent 
Confucian scholar during the Han dynasty, suggested that the emperor 
was the son of heaven because he had the mandate of heaven, and 
proposed that Confucianism became the ruling orthodoxy. Emperor 
Wu (156 – 87 B.C.) of the Han dynasty adopted Dong's proposal and 
promoted Confucianism, thereby entrusting the dominance for the 
next two thousand years. 
Confucianism promoted the view that man is naturally good and is 
guided by morality which is more effective than just rule of law. Thus 
ideally the leader has authority due to his moral position and citizens 
would follow the example of the ruler. Throughout the Maoist years 
and to a lesser extent during the reform period, virtue was deﬁned in 
terms of Communist ideals. Where necessary, 'sacriﬁcing one's own life 
to complete one's virtue' and 'giving up life to attain righteousness' are 
considered natural by both Confucian and Communist ideology. For 
the past two thousand years, governance has hinged entirely on the 
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moral quality of the rulers and ofﬁcials (Guo 2006). However, as the 
country moved toward modernisation, Confucianism lost much of its 
inﬂuence (Hu 2007).
With Maoism and then Modernisation and institutionalised attempts 
to remove religion, the government's policy has been to operate a 'united' 
Chinese front committed to the good of the nation. This national good 
resides within the broad concepts of patriotism, mutual respect, and 
socialism. The government's policy towards religion was clear dur-
ing the agony of the Cultural Revolution. Today, there are 40 million 
Communist Party members in a population of about one billion, and 
the percentage of the population that actually follows religion is rather 
small. It is therefore deemed that religious communities no longer pose 
a threat to social order. Nevertheless, there are ethnic communities in 
China for whom religion and ethnic identity are inseparable. These 
include Muslims and Tibetans where repression of religion has been 
associated with oppression. Indeed, attacks on Buddhist monasteries 
and temples during the Cultural Revolution amounted to an attempt to 
efface the cultural heritage of China itself (Ariarajah 1986). 
The Chinese government has persecuted many new religious and 
spiritual groups, including Falun Gong, though they deny that this is the 
case.  Falun Gong appears to be the most serious threat to the govern-
ment and was banned in 2000. It was said to be a cult. Many analysts 
believe that Communist Party ofﬁcials see the movement as a political 
threat. They recognize that nationalistic uprisings in Chinese history 
were spurred by similar folk religious movements.
There is no doubt that to a certain extent religious freedom exists 
in China today. To begin with, religions are expected to function in a 
patriotic way, which obliges them to approve if not actually support 
the present social, political, and economic order. In any case, no room is 
allowed for religious communities to engage in any sort of criticism of 
the present order. The government makes it clear that fundamentally, 
religious communities are solely concerned with spiritual affairs and 
function using a self-supporting, self-governing, and self-propagation 
system without serious external collaboration and more importantly 
assume no role in political matters.  The authority of the People's Re-
public of China keeps on afﬁrming their socialist standpoint, though not 
without certain criticisms of the Marxist orthodoxy. It is the reafﬁrma-
tion of the orthodox Marxist ideal of religion which was repeated by 
Mao Zedong when he insisted that religious idealism and the dialectic 
materialism of the CCP were contradictory. Only Mao Zedong's Little 
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Red Book of quotations was allowed and other religious texts such as 
the Bible and the Koran were effectively banned. China still prohibits 
the sale of Bibles through regular book shops despite the irony of manu-
facturing the text and being a leading exporter of Bibles.
New attempts are now being made to understand the role of reli-
gion in Chinese society and tolerance is exhibited in matters such as 
the establishment of the Institute for the Study of World Religions in 
Beijing. Another interesting point is that on 15 March 1979 under Mao's 
successor Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Government issued its ofﬁcial 
policy on religion through the Bureau of Religious Affairs. This policy 
decreed that every citizen is free to believe, or disbelieve in any religion 
that one chooses. All religions are equal in the eyes of the authority 
and the political status of believers and non-believers with their own 
organisations is recognised. This policy also saw the re-establishment 
of the ﬁve main religions – Buddhism, Islam, Taoism, Catholicism, and 
Protestantism (Phongphit 1986). 
There seems to be an apparent lack of interest in religion in China to-
day (Pas 1989). This situation is demonstrated in two surveys conducted 
in 1995 and 2005. The surveys covered the cities of Nantong, Baoding, 
Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Guangzhou, and Beijing, Benxi, Qufu, 
Suzhou, Changsha, and Danjiangkou. The surveys revealed that more 
than 83 percent of the citizens in these cities were non-religious and 
atheists and in 2000 only 5.3 percent admitted to being religious. In 1995 
the ﬁgure had been 2 percent. In 2005, the majority of urban Chinese 
claimed to be non-religious (51.8 percent) and atheists (32.9 percent). 
In February 2007, a new government-sponsored survey on spiritu-
ality in China estimated that the number of religious believers is far 
higher than usually recognized amounting to as many as 300 million. 
The ﬁndings, based on a poll of 4,500 people conducted by East China 
Normal University in Shanghai, supported growing indications that 
many Chinese are searching for new value systems to replace the Com-
munist doctrine that has been jettisoned in favour of market econom-
ics (Washington Post Foreign Service, 8 February 2007). The poll found 
a remarkable surge in religious belief that suggests a surge in moral 
inspiration that has not been reﬂected in the ofﬁcial estimates. This 
ﬁnding seemed to be of interest to Chinese leaders as they have sought 
to rebuild conﬁdence in a Party apparatus often compromised by cor-
ruption and distance from the commoners. Historical Chinese religions 
such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam accounted for 67 percent of those 
who declared themselves believers. Ofﬁcially sanctioned Christian 
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organisations have said 15 million Protestants and 6 million Catholics 
participate in their religious practices in China. However, Chinese and 
foreign researchers estimate that the ﬁgure could be higher due to the 
semi-secrecy which makes an accurate count impossible. The main factor 
in the fast growth of religion is not attributed to just population growth 
but to an expanded freedom of belief in China. During the 1960s and 
1970s radical political orthodoxy enforced by Mao Zedong and his fol-
lowers replaced religious beliefs, often under threat of imprisonment. 
Although the Communist Party remains ofﬁcially atheist, Chinese are 
now free to practice the religion of their choice to an extent that it does 
not challenge the party's monopoly on power.  
Professionalism, Spirituality, and Governance
Most problems related to administrative professionalism revolve around 
the control of knowledge and expertise. Confucianism and Maoism 
have exercised control over information and so have prevented and 
undermined the manifestation of democratic values. As the social and 
political theorist Zygmunt Bauman (1986) has noted, 'The communist 
revolution explicitly proclaimed and ostensibly practiced the unity of 
power and knowledge, the innermost core of the intellectual idiom.' 
Hence, one need scarcely look further than the slogans 'The party knows 
best' and 'The party is always right' to posit alternative values.
If spiritual afﬁrmation is not tied to real political values and direc-
tions, what good is the expression of such public piety? And how could 
genuine discussion of moral, spiritual, or religious values in public 
life contribute to the formation of much needed reformed political 
options? Ultimately, it should concern the representation of public 
reason. Chantal Mouffe (1993) takes politics as 'the set of practices and 
institutions through which an order is created, organizing human co-
existence in the context of conﬂictuality provided by the political' and 
refers to the agonistic struggle for hegemony. The political refers to the 
potential emergence of antagonism. Mouffe argues that every society 
is the product of a series of practices attempting to establish order in 
a context of contingency and refers to the struggle for hegemony as 
'agonism': the symbolic context over the constitution of society, the 
institution of an order in which a potentially inter-communal conﬂict 
(war) is represented as communal (politics).  Mouffe has appropri-
ated the notion of hegemony from Antonio Gramsci (Schaap 2007). In 
Arendt's major works, the political refers to the potential experience of 
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solidarity in moments of collective action. According to Arendt, politics 
is public. It is possible only where there is a public space within which 
men and women can appear before each other. Politics arises out of the 
plurality of perspectives that individuals bring to bear on the world. 
The above brieﬂy outlined arguments and deﬁnitions provide a solid 
basis for discussing modern Chinese politics. It is in the context of Chi-
na's present political landscape that I am canvassing the potential for 
spirituality that, in turn, may address the moral degeneration that has 
been identiﬁed among public administrators and an attendant silent 
crisis in governance. 
The dichotomy of proﬁt and righteousness remain entrenched in Con-
fucian tradition.  However, Deng Xiaoping popularised the function of 
proﬁt-seeking at the beginning of the process of economic reforms. The 
reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping have undermined the Communist 
ideology, changed China's socioeconomic system, and increased China's 
international status. 
Independent of their adherence to religion, most Chinese are strug-
gling with what spirituality means for their work and family. If there 
is spirituality, then why is it solely for the purpose of stating loyalty to 
the party and state? Is religion such a threat to the CCP's power, au-
thority, and legitimacy? Religions which are not state-sanctioned are 
often portrayed as part of separatist movements and no one under the 
age of 18 is allowed to practice any religion. At the same time the fear 
of the relationship between pro-democracy movements, underground 
churches and external inﬂuences is used to justify repression. 
Before the 1949 Communist ascendancy over China, most Chinese 
seemed to be politically apathetic and ignorant. Between the 1950s 
and the 1970s, the CCP launched a series of mass political movements 
that led to a Chinese populace who exhibited signiﬁcant enthusiasm in 
relation to public and political affairs. During the years of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76), almost all the citizens were concerned and par-
ticipated in politics. Since reforms were ﬁrst implemented the Chinese 
have been perceived to be obsessed about money-making and material 
goods with no interest in public affairs. 
Anti-Confucianism peaked during the Cultural Revolution so 
much so that Mao launched the Anti-Confucius campaign. However, 
the state's attitude towards Confucianism softened in the later years 
of the Cultural Revolution and in the aftermath of 1989 democratic 
movement Deng Xiaoping reintroduced the civil service examination, 
a traditional Confucian concept that seems to pick up again under Hu 
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Jintao's tenure (Hu 2007). President Hu Jintao is generally considered 
to have been selected by Deng Xiaoping to succeed Jiang Zemin. The 
history of the Communist Party's leadership is not just one of leaders 
but, more importantly, of their ideologies: Mao Zedong Thought, Deng 
Xiaoping Theory, Jiang Zemin's 'Three Represents' and now Hu Jintao's 
'Harmonious Socialist Society.' Each leader's ideology combines their 
own novel formulations with particular elements strategically selected 
from previous leaders' guiding thoughts, in turn reinventing the ad-
ministrative prescriptions. This means that there is an overarching 
ideological continuity between leaders as well as their own particular 
programme being the logical consequence of that which had preceded 
it. These ideological frameworks necessarily adhere to some general 
Marxist concept of historical development leading to one ultimate des-
tination which is Communism. This means that each leader's ideology 
necessarily addresses two issues: where China currently is on the path 
and how China can best progress along the path (Herschler 2007). It is 
thought that this model is based not only on continued economic growth 
but also on fair distribution of the growth unlike the unrestrained and 
unbalanced growth of the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin eras. 
Building a 'harmonious socialist society' is presented as a natural con-
sequence of the Party's success in upholding reforms. These include the 
legal system, economic disparities, employment, morality and culture, 
creativity and innovation, public administration and environmental ac-
tions. It is clear that the central government is to play a decisive role in 
dispelling contradictions through a range of national policy endeavours 
and scholars are tempted to conclude that Hu is taking a more Socialist 
path. In this economically dynamic and politically intriguing nation, 
much of Hu's political demeanour seems to suggest a Confucian style 
of leadership, one who governs by virtuous example, but old Maoist 
structures remain with traditional-sounding rhetoric about harmony and 
peace. Hu advocates the principle of Confucianism where the interests 
of rulers and people are closely related and mutually beneﬁcial, while 
the majority of the leaders share the Leninist veneration for authority 
and orthodoxy. 
Many problems facing China today, such as inequality, immorality, 
insecurity, alienation, rootlessness and ruthlessness can be linked to the 
relentless pursuit of efﬁciency and the neglect of human problems by 
leaders whose training is limited to science and engineering. Technoc-
racy has taken root in China's economic and political system since the 
1980s. It is an important step towards acquiring what Max Weber termed 
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a rational-legal basis of political legitimacy. However, the lack of popular 
sovereignty and innate tendency toward oligarchic rule will eventually 
weaken the legitimacy of bureaucratic technocracy (Guo 2007).
In this paper I argue that a silent crisis in governance may well exist 
in the People's Republic of China. In describing state-society relations, 
government is always the head, the thinking part of the body. One of 
the important tests of good governance is to measure how well govern-
mental institutions identify critical issues and choices facing society now 
and in the future. This is apparently difﬁcult as China remains indelibly 
communist while avoiding any unsettling political reforms, much less 
a democratic path. The identiﬁcation of societal problems is therefore 
not distinguishable from proposing solution. 
It is in the above context that the Tibetan's struggle to regain and main-
tain their civilisation against enormous odds is continuing. Reproaching 
the China authorities can result in arrests and imprisonment that are 
often made on the basis of state surveillance. China's notion of Tibetan 
Buddhism as the backbone of Tibetan resistance to assimilation and the 
insistence that Tibetans yield to China's authority, has culminated in 
recent crisis of civil disturbances in the ﬁrst quarter of 2008. At the same 
time, and all too readily, the Tibetans have become accustomed to being 
portrayed as victims. It is difﬁcult to envisage the possibility of autonomy 
for Tibet. Observers constantly point to conﬂict though the Dalai Lama 
demonstrates the profound importance of religion in the tolerance and 
resolution of conﬂict. A similar situation also arose in the Soviet Union 
where Stalin's policies caused the unjust deaths of thousands of people, 
destroyed Buryat Buddhist culture and split the Buryat into separate 
administrative units amid hysterical accusations of Pan-Mongolism to 
enforce loyalty to Russia. Widespread armed uprisings against collec-
tivisation in 1929-32 in the south, east, and west of Buryat lands hailed 
the freedom of worship. It was not just a matter of peasant resentment 
of forced egalitarianism of the collectives but also for ideological and 
political concerns in opposition to Communism. By 1938, virtually all 
Buddhist lamas and activists perished. On the other hand, knowledge 
of such matters is thrust inward and hidden and people lived their lives 
through Marxism-Stalinism. However,the outrage of the people against 
guandao at the time of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 was not hidden. It 
taught ofﬁcals a lesson. After the Tiananmen Incident, with the exception 
of certain areas of Guangdong and Shandong provinces, reform and liber-
alisation stagnated nationwide. The Chinese Communist Party found that 
they must be ﬁrm in their dealings with corruption. If they followed this 
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path in combination with the economic leadership of Zhu Rongji, there 
would be the possibility of comparatively stable development of China's 
politics and economics. Corruption is an inevitable weakness of a Com-
munist Party dictatorship, indeed of any single-party dictatorship, due to 
the absence of checks and balances on power to effectively control it.
The next issue of considerable concern for both China's leaders and 
Chinese citizens relates to the effective implementation of public policy. 
The cost of government failure is rarely identiﬁed and publicised and 
this is the case not only in China but in many other countries as well. 
Implementation studies have generally emphasised the gap between 
what is intended and what is actually achieved. Obviously govern-
ments that lack the ability to implement policy with some degree of 
effectiveness are wasting the resources, time and effort of those who 
make public policy. While there is no doubt that much is achieved by 
government on a regular basis, several developments suggest a reduced 
capacity of government to engage effectively in policy implementation 
and this is something that could be attributed to a lack of spirituality and 
religiosity among government administrators. Public human resource 
management has served many masters in China. China's leaders have 
depended on both ancient wisdom and communist doctrine as guides 
to action. Now, new guides may well be needed.
Paternalism results in government organs overseeing subordinate 
administrations to the degree that they stiﬂe the ability to make op-
erational decisions and destroy their incentives to cut costs and meet 
market needs. This applies particularly to those enterprises that continue 
to be state run. It also means that inefﬁcient practices and enterprises 
are protected. In the past state-owned enterprises have been put in a 
position where they 'bear responsibility for proﬁts but not for losses'. 
For those enterprises that continue under direct government administra-
tion this situation continues. It has been recognised that unless reform 
measures are coordinated with each other and implemented with an 
overall design, their effectiveness will be diminished and it will be dif-
ﬁcult to control the results of reform. 
In post-reform China the shortage of energy resources has been exac-
erbated by the economic consequences of the administrative and ﬁscal 
decentralisation that took place under the umbrella of economic reform. 
Given the irrational aspects of price and taxation and other ﬁscal incen-
tives, localities have had incentive to invest in processing industries which 
have a shorter investment cycle and yield higher proﬁts, thereby fuelling 
high-speed growth and exacerbating energy and supply shortages. 
_________________________________________________________________________21
______________________________________Reinventing Administrative Prescriptions
Administrative Issues
Poor governance has costs that are less dramatic in the short term but are 
cumulative. In this paper I am arguing not only that poor governance is 
cumulative but that the governance crisis in China could be signiﬁcant 
given the level of unethical decision-making and work procedures as 
experienced by many. The creation of effective governance capacity is a 
lengthy struggle and for that reason alone reform should be promoted. 
For all the rhetoric about market reform, the Chinese government con-
tinues to play a considerable role in the lives of many citizens. At the 
same time, the administration's response to corruption, which remains 
disturbingly prevalent, has often been slow and inadequate. 
Religion has been widely credited with providing coherent morality 
systems among people and, maybe even more importantly, the lack of 
religion and/or spirituality among public administrators can be seen to 
have the capacity to weaken public decision-making to the point where 
bad governance is wide-spread.  However, there are doubts raised in 
relation to this point of view and perhaps the strongest doubts over the 
wisdom of expanding the relationship between religion and public admin-
istration have been over the question of whether nurturing strong values 
founded on diverse theologies and cultures can actually create the kind of 
coherent values and national identity that modern societies are searching 
for.  Given the secularisation of China and the much discussed views of 
social thinkers like Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, 
Max Weber, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, religion could be expected to 
gradually fade in importance and cease to be signiﬁcant with the advent of 
industrialisation, rationalisation, and urbanisation. However, on the other 
side of the ledger, there is no question that the traditional secularisation 
thesis needs updating. In relatively secure societies, remnants of religion 
have not died away and many developed societies associate themselves 
with a religion on ofﬁcial forms. In vulnerable societies especially those 
in poorer nations religiosity persists more strongly. The most persuasive 
evidence about secularisation concerns values and behaviour. The critical 
test is what people say is important to their lives and what they actually 
do. Many people who have business dealings seem to be sceptical over the 
work practices, inconsistencies, and values which are steadily diminish-
ing in China. The indicators of religiosity seem to apply here though no 
empirically research on the issue is readily available. Evidence established 
through contacts admittedly may not be conclusive evidence, but it does 
provide interesting 'food for thought'.
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In China today, market-oriented reforms are widely blamed for 
moral degeneration. The reforms promoted by Deng Xiaoping have 
produced many money worshippers. Increased levels of selﬁshness 
and mistrust have accompanied the social transition from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy.  With the intensiﬁcation of 
market-oriented reforms (particularly since the early 1990s), business 
and money-making have become even more important concerns. Citi-
zens have also become indifferent to political struggles, ideology and 
movements (Guo 2006). 
China's mounting domestic problems resulting from accelerated 
market reforms have caused deep concern among intellectuals. Corrup-
tion, crime, a ﬂoating population, unemployment, and income dispar-
ity have had a destabilising effect on the social order. Grave domestic 
concerns and uncertainties not only strengthened the position of those 
who consistently supported neo-authoritarian politics, but also many 
who previously favoured liberal democratic ideas. They have also been 
converted to neo-conservatism. Chinese political leaders appear to em-
brace authoritarianism at the ﬁrst sign of crisis. 
It is obvious that the majority of ordinary urban citizens support and 
trust the Chinese government policies and the CCP regime even though 
they clearly have a large number of concerns. Another case of concern 
is that the private ﬁrms are vulnerable to rent-seeking ofﬁcials. Struc-
tural disadvantages have induced private ﬁrms to engage in intensive 
networking to cope with uncertainty and as a means of acquiring status. 
Networks are proactively cultivated with business contacts receiving 
ever more expensive and non-reciprocated gifts which in turn leads to 
intensive investment in networking (Chen 2007). It has even been argued 
that network ties with high-ranking ofﬁcials are a valuable and rare 
resource that is difﬁcult to imitate. This resource is a source of competi-
tive advantage. Party afﬁliations and cadre status has become a form 
of capital – with the human, social, ﬁnancial and political intertwined 
and mutually reinforcing one another (Chen 2007). This situation, that 
I believe could well be rooted in the lack of religiosity and spiritual-
ity among public servants, makes it necessary for the government to 
cultivate citizens of good character with a commitment to serve and 
promote the common good, even though the obligation to serve others 
need not be overtly religious.
Bribery-case convictions in China have been applauded, but more 
must be done. In 2007 China's anti-graft ﬁght proved to be particularly 
fruitful with prominent ﬁgures like the former party chief of Shanghai, 
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Chen Liangyu, being implicated in the misuse of the city's public social 
security fund. He was convicted. Some other high-ranking ﬁgures re-
moved from their positions on corruption charges included Liu Zhihua, 
former vice-mayor of Beijing; Qiu Xiaohua, former head of the National 
Statistics Bureau; Zheng Xiaoyu, former head of China's State Food and 
Drug Administration; Cao Wenzhuang, former director of the same de-
partment and Hao Heping, former director of medical equipment of the 
State Food and Drug Administration. Corrupt practices by prominent 
ﬁgures undermine the implementation of policies and pose a signiﬁcant 
threat to the public interest.
Concluding note
Recent Chinese government efforts to develop an ethic of public ad-
ministration grounded in good governance are compatible with the 
nature of spirituality and, on a quite hopeful note, whilst China's 
market transition has been state-initiated, gradual and experimental, it 
can be pointed out that this approach could be copied with regard to 
the promotion of religiosity and spirituality. Currently, values such as 
individualism, nationalism, and capitalism appear to be more inﬂuen-
tial than religiosity and spirituality not only in China but also in other 
parts of the world, though we must recognise that there are notable 
exceptions to this rule. 
As is the case elsewhere, Chinese public servants and leaders are 
obligated to serve as exemplars of spiritual virtues if not religiosity 
through their commitment to the common good, service to others and 
benevolent action and it is this obligation that provides a link between 
public service and spirituality. It seems fair to argue that China's leaders 
may well have an interest in reinventing public policy implementation 
by promoting elements of spirituality. It is a scenario that ﬁts well with 
the Chinese ethos of pragmatism.
LooSee Beh is Senior Lecturer at Department of Administrative Studies And 
Politics, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (lucybeh@um.edu.my). 
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